CPANSA-Reverse-Proxy-2026-75922: Reverse-Proxy vulnerability

Publisher giterlizzi Document category csaf_security_advisory
Initial release date 2026-08-23T00:00:00 Engine CSAF Perl Toolkit 0.26
Current release date 2026-08-23T00:00:00 Build Date
Current version 1 Status final
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.3 Severity Medium
Original language Language en
Also referred to

Vulnerability Description

Reverse::Proxy versions before 0.04 for Perl allow HTTP request smuggling via a percent-decoded PATH_INFO written unencoded to the upstream request line.

PSGI hands PATH_INFO to an application percent-decoded, so a %XX sequence in the client URL has become a raw byte by the time the proxy sees it. The proxy appends that byte string to the upstream base URL, and for an Upgrade tunnel writes it into a request line it serializes itself, re-encoding nothing in either path. The HTTP client that sends the resulting URL does not validate the target either. A path containing %0d%0a therefore arrives at the upstream as a CRLF that ends the request line, and a decoded space, '?' or '#' truncates it the same way.

Everything the client writes after the CRLF is read by the upstream as a second request. On the buffered path it arrives on a keep-alive connection the proxy pools and reuses for other clients. Its method, path and headers are all chosen by the client, and the upstream attributes it to the proxy, so it reaches upstream paths that the proxy's own routing does not expose.

Vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-75922

Vulnerability Description

Reverse::Proxy versions before 0.04 for Perl allow HTTP request smuggling via a percent-decoded PATH_INFO written unencoded to the upstream request line.

PSGI hands PATH_INFO to an application percent-decoded, so a %XX sequence in the client URL has become a raw byte by the time the proxy sees it. The proxy appends that byte string to the upstream base URL, and for an Upgrade tunnel writes it into a request line it serializes itself, re-encoding nothing in either path. The HTTP client that sends the resulting URL does not validate the target either. A path containing %0d%0a therefore arrives at the upstream as a CRLF that ends the request line, and a decoded space, '?' or '#' truncates it the same way.

Everything the client writes after the CRLF is read by the upstream as a second request. On the buffered path it arrives on a keep-alive connection the proxy pools and reuses for other clients. Its method, path and headers are all chosen by the client, and the upstream attributes it to the proxy, so it reaches upstream paths that the proxy's own routing does not expose.

Weakness CWE-93 : Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')

Product status

Known affected
Product Score
Reverse-Proxy less than 0.04
CVSS Version CVSS Vector CVSS Base Score CVSS Base Severity
3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 Medium
Fixed

giterlizzi

Namespace: https://github.com/giterlizzi/

gdt@cpan.org

References

Revision history

Version Date of the revision Summary of the revision
1 Sun Aug 23 00:00:00 2026 First release

Sharing rules

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