CPANSA-Lemonldap-NG-Portal-2026-92289: Lemonldap-NG-Portal vulnerability
| Publisher | giterlizzi | Document category | csaf_security_advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial release date | 2026-09-25T00:00:00 | Engine | CSAF Perl Toolkit 0.26 |
| Current release date | 2026-09-25T00:00:00 | Build Date | |
| Current version | 1 | Status | final |
| CVSS v3.1 Base Score | 9.1 | Severity | Critical |
| Original language | Language | en | |
| Also referred to | |||
Vulnerability Description
Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PKCE or secret" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.
With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.
An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user's access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.
Vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-92289
Vulnerability DescriptionLemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PKCE or secret" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.
With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.
An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user's access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.
| Weakness | CWE-1390 : Weak Authentication |
|---|
Product status
Known affected
| Product | Score | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lemonldap-NG-Portal greater than or equal 2.23.0 and less than 2.23.4 |
|
Fixed
- Lemonldap-NG-Portal greater than or equal 2.23.4
giterlizzi
Namespace: https://github.com/giterlizzi/
gdt@cpan.org
References
- CPANSA-Lemonldap-NG-Portal-2026-92289 JSON self
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/giterlizzi/perl-CPANSA-CSAF/develop/csaf/white/2026/cpansa-lemonldap-ng-portal-2026-92289.json - https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/releases/v2.23.4 external
https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/releases/v2.23.4 - https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719 external
https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/25/2 external
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/25/2 - https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719 external
https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719 - CVE-2026-92289 (NVD) external
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92289
Revision history
| Version | Date of the revision | Summary of the revision |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Fri Sep 25 00:00:00 2026 | First release |
Sharing rules
TLP:WHITE
For the TLP version see: https://www.first.org/tlp/